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1. IntroductiOn
These notes provide a guide and some comments on a portion of 
the literature of experimental economics. They represent thoughts 
and criticisms. developed in the course of a seminar in experimental 
economics at Purdue University. The references do not constitute an 
e�ensive bibliography. For an excellent summary of the experimental 
oligopoly literature� the interested reader is urged to consult Fried­
man [6J, and for additional general discussion of the scope and signifi­
cance of experimental economics and for further bibliographic refer­
ences, see Naylor [11]. 
* 
Support by the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknow-
ledged. The present form of this manuscript is a revision of a pre­
liminary version prepared in the spring of 1969. 
2, Utility and Decision Theory 
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The earliest contributions to experimental economics were con­
cerned with the construction of empirical commodity-indifference 
curves and of Neumann-Morgenstern utility curves for individuals. 
So far as we have been able to determine, the v.-ork of. Thurstone [21] 
on indifference curves represents the first attempt to validate an 
economic proposition by experimental means. Thurstone1s study 
exhibits the usual complement of beginner's errors, but its lack of 
sophistication should not blur. its significance in demonstrating the 
highly operational character of utility theory. It is tempting, if not 
already common practice, to teach utility and demand theory by asser­
tion, by an appeal to the 11rnental experiment," by an appeal to 11self­
evident11 propositions, or by taking refuge in the methodology of posi-
tive economics wherein consequences, rather than assumptions, are 
deemed to be the proper subjects of empirical testing in a theory. As 
a result students of economics are sometimes poorly motivated to 
accept, even provisionally, the most elementary and essential concepts 
of the science. Economic theory is easily considered to be more 11un­
real11 or 11 abstract" than in fact need be the case. The study by Mac­
Crimmon arid Toda [10] provides a modern� experimentally sophisticated 
treatment of the much-neglected behavioral foundation of demand 
theory. 
By_contrast, much attention has been devoted to the experimental 
study of Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory for choices between uncer­
tain prospects. Indeed, this work is sufficiently rich and sophisticated 
to pose. difficult problems of representative selection, but Dolbear [4] 
is particularly useful in providing good summaries of the experimental 
literature, and the principal issues of measurement in utility and deci­
sion theory under uncertainty. 
The concepts of utility are not only basic to microeconomic 
theory, they are also basic to experimental methodology in general. 
It is now well established e�erimentally that people prefer more 
money to less, that there are nonmonetary utilities and disutilities 
in any decision situation, and that subject's decisions can be inter­
preted in terms of balancing these subjective values. In this sense, 
it is important in all experimental design to take utility theory seri­
ously. Consequently, one does not ask a subject if he prefers A to 
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B. Rather one designs a choice situation in which it is in the interest 
of the subject to reveal that he prefers A to B if he does, and other­
wise if he does not. Furthermore, choices should be offered and pay­
offs made so as to control on the effect of wealth .and of previous ·out­
comes on preferences. The common technique used by MacCrirnmon­
Toda and Dolbear, and suggested by Yaari, is to confront the subject 
with a series of pairwise preference choices with the understanding 
that when he has completed the task, one of the pairs will be chosen at 
random and the subject will receive (or engage in it, if it is a gamble) 
that mernbe:::- of the pair which he says he preferred. If he has a pref-
erence ordering and desires to make choices in accordance with those 
preferences, then he must state truthfully that member of each pair 
that he prefers. For example, if there are N equally likely pairs 
(Gi,Hi)' i::: 1,2,··•,N, and he is an expected utility maximizer, then 
E(U) 
and 
n"!ax :S(U) I I N max[U(G1), U(H1)1 + Nmax[U(Gz),U(H21} 
I 
+ · • · + N max fU(GN), U(HN)1. 
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A subject can only maximize by revealing his preferred choice in each 
pair. By this device acceptance s·ets of objects or gambles .can be 
separated from rejection sets to reveal indifference curves� or in the 
Dolbear study, permit utility indexes to be constructed. 
Siegel 1s paper [14] should be considered as a case stt..2y in three 
closely related pitfalls of experimental economics: 
{l) Caution should be exercised in interpreting experimental results 
as indicative of "irrational" behavior, especially where the reward struc­
ture is weak. 
(2) Inherent in any decision situation (experimental or not) are cer­
tain subjective 11costs11 or disutilities associated with the process of deci­
sion making and reporting as well as the postulated utilitie5 of the deci­
sions. That is, there are "transactions costs11 in any task situation which 
can be expected to influence decisions. 
(3) The consequences of decision making in the task situation may 
have positive or negative commodity value whose effects are confounded 
with those of any explicit, controlled, reward structure. 
In short take utility theory seriously� and interpret it broadly, in 
trying to understand subject responses. 
In this much-studied experimental task, subjects must predict 
Bernoulli outcomes in a two-choice situation. They have two choices 
(a1, a2) on each trial, and, following each such choice, nature or chance 
chooses one of two alternatives (91,92). The consequence of (ai,6j) is 
cij: 
Probability w 1-w 
�' Act 01 ez 
•1 el l c1z 
az cz1 czz 
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The state el occurs with ;;:---::igrammed probability rr, ez \Vith probabil­
ity 1-rr. Typically in the::e experiments, the.value ofrr is not revealed 
to the subjects. Let p be tbe asymptotic expected probability that the sub­
ject will choose a1 (i.e., i:::he proportion of trials in which he predicts 81). 
The Siegel models are con'Cerned with the relation between p and such in­
dependent variables as ir .;!..:'.Id the reward structure. 
The significance of Siegel's contribution can only be fully appre­
ciated against the backgrou.!ld in which some behavioral scientists have 
in terpreted as irrational t.he failure of subjects to maximize by repeated 
choice of the more frequer:::t event. Yet experiments with this task, going 
back to 1939, had typically not reinforced subject responses with monetary 
rewards or penalties. Utility theory does not predict that people will make 
the 11correct11 decision v.�hen it is not in their interest to do so. What 
Siegel shows very clearly is that the alleged evidence for "irrational" be­
havior is the exception that proves the (utility) rule. 
We will derive a somewhat generalized version of Siegel1s model I, 
with a more explici� treatirn.ent of the reward structure and the underlying 
assumptions about utility. Siegel assumes that the subject 1s choices in 
the stationary (asymptotic.} state can be regarded as consistent with the 
hypothesis that he maxirniz:es a utility function u(p). However, the sub­
jective consequences of the choices associated with p involve considerably 
more than the subjective value of any explicit monetary payoffs. Siegel 
seeks to explain behavior in both payoff and nonpayoff experimental condi­
tions. The consequences cij of (ai• 9j) are assumed to provide three 
sources of subjective value. There is value associa�ed with just 11winning, 11 
i.e., predicting correctly, independently of the amount won. Thus there 
are different utilities associated with consequences c11 and c22 (i.e., 
"winn) than with c12 and c21 (i.e., "losen) quite apart from. payoffs. 
Secondly, -if in general there is a monetary reward for a correct predic­
tion and a penalty for a.."- i..::correct prediction, these monetary consequences 
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have utility. Finally, the repea�ed choice of ai generates utility losses, 
quite apart from either being correct, or receiving or losing money. 
This is due to boredom and monotony in not diversifying one is .choices. 
Hence, values of p near 1/2 provi.de greater subjective value th<i:n those 
near 1- or O. 
Specifically, in the general case, we assume u(p) to be decompos­
able into three additive components: 
(1) If x is the number of auc;cessful' predictio�s in n'stationary 
state trials, we associate a utility_U1 {x) with these successes. If we 
assume that U 1 is_ proportional to the expected number of correct pre­
dictions in n tri.<i.ls, then 
U 1 (x) = aE(x,) = anP 
where a> 0 is a behavioral constant, and P = prr + {l -p}(l - tt) . 
(2) If u � 0 is the payoff for each successful prediction, and 
p � 0 is the penalty charged f?r each failure, then the number of units 
of money received in n trials is y = µx - p(n- x), and the Neu.mann­
Morgenstern utility fwic.tion is 
U2(y) = E[U(yl] = E(U(ux-p(n-xllJ 
where U(m) -is the utility of m units of money. For illustration we pos­
tulate a quadratic utility func�ion, 
AE(yl + BE(y21 
A[(µ+plnP-pn] + B(p+µl2 nP(l-PI
where (A> 0, B < 0) are behavioral constants·, and E(y) and E(y�) are 
computed with the binomial mass function. 
(3) Finally, there is a utility U3(p) associated with variability of 
choice. For n trials, assume 
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U 3!pl = bnp.!1 -pl 
where b> 0 is a cOns.tant and u3(p) has the property that lt _is maximized 
with p'= _l/Z, 
'Hence, total utility for n trials is 
u(pl 
2 anP + An(lµ+olP - p] + Bn(µ+pl P(l-PI + bnp(l-pl. 
This criterion function gerierali�e� Siegel's 'model I, .-and explicitly 
distinguishes between rewa.rd-penalty .parameter� (µ � p �. and behavio_ral _ 
parameters (a, b, A, B). Since-u11(p) < _O, necessary and sufficient c_ondi­
tions fOr max .u(p) _are Og>sl 
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b +(Zn - II [a+A(µ +pl+ B(µ +ol {2n - II] 
2b + ZB((µ+p)(2n- l l]2 
where if > holds p0 = 0, if<. holds p0 = 1, and if= holds w.e·have 
_O < p 0 < l.  In the absence of monetary payo�fs, u = p - = _o, 
and we get probability matching, p = 'IT, if and only if a=· b, as in 
Siegel 1 s model I. 
Siegel 1s model ll could be generalized in the above spirit by as­
suming different utility functions for a correct prediction of the more 
frequent event and a correct prediction for the less frequent event. 
Thus, with ir> t. we could write U1{x1) -= a1E(xi) = a�npn-, w?ere x1 
is the numbe'.r of correct p�edictions of .0i, and·v·1(xz) :;:_ -a2E{x�). 
a2n(l -p)(l - u) with x2 the number of corre<=:t prediction�· of. e2. 
and V 1 provide richer means of accounting for the "•:o.m>ffi<>diltv v,,J,,e• •;
., .. · .. 1 
of gambling. Total utility would be u(p) 
l 
U3(p). 
8 
The above models, and those of Siegel, suffer by ignoring sub­
ject transient, or dynamic, behavior. Steady-state behavior should be 
a special case of a more general dynamic model. , The,natural model of 
optimal play-by-play behavior would b� a Bayesian l�arning model tha_t 
modifies subjective probabilities, and predictions, in the light of trial 
outcomes (01,92). Thus a consequence on a g iven trial not only yields
immediate situation utility, but also information On. the parameters of 
the Bernoulli proce�s which influence future optimal decisions. Such a 
model has been derived by Emir H. SJ1.urford[l5], but it .includes neither 
Siegel's consideration of the utilities of diversification nor gambling 
(being "correct"). 
Yaari [22] has proposed a return to the pre-Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility period by dropping the dominance, or independence, axiom, but 
adding the assuinption of convexity which isp of course, fundamental to 
the theory of markets. The expected utility theorem which follows if we 
adntlt of doniinance or iD:dependence is mathematically very convenient 
because it allows us to apply all of the expectation calculus. But does it 
adequately desciibe behavior? Yaari suggestS it does .not, and the ex­
perimental results bear him out. Furthermore, the experimental re­
sults strongly support convexity. 
The importance of Yaari 's "contribution to experimental methodology 
is perhaps the emphasis on restricting theoretical constructs to those 
which are observable: What can be observed in utility theory are those
gambles that an individual will reject or accept, i.e., his decisions,
rather than probability numbers <;>n which he is presu.n:ied to._ act. Fur­
thermore, in Yaari1s approach,_ it is still possible to interpret subject
choices in terms of a concept of subjective probabilities provided that 
the choices are co.Osistent with such a concept. But the experimental 
procedure does not depend upon such a concept� 
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By way of criticism, Yaa'.ri's experimental·procedure for construe-· 
ting the offer curve by either the_a_uction me.tho� or_ the method of letting
subjects raise their·own bids on an accepted g;;i.roble _[22, page _2_�5] is 
not satisfactory .. The auction method does not measure the 11highest11 
price a subject _is willing to pay �or a given gamble but rather the price 
he is willing to .pay for a compound gamble yielding (i) _the given
gamble if his bid is higher than the competing bids. or ni) nothing, if 
his bid is ·not higher. The auction method intro·duces the additional un­
certainties analyzed in (sealed-bid) auction theory [19],· and unnecessarily 
contaminates the experiment. The method of letting 11the. subjects them­
selves raise their own bids by 25 per cent and see if the resultant bid is 
'definitely too high' 11 (22, p. 285] greatly complicates the decision task. 
Now we have to worry not only ,about the utility of a gamble but also the 
utility of giving false information on the :value. of the gambl�. Such prob­
lems are .likely to be avoided . if the experimenter does a simple decision 
theoretic analysis of the experimental task from the point of view· of the 
subject to determine· if it is in the interest of the subject to reveal what 
the .experimenter Y..ants to know. The theory underlying the experiment' 
(that subjects have a preference ordering over gambles) must be assumed 
also to apply to the subject's choices. If it does not, then there is nothing 
to measure in the first place. These criticisms should not be allowed to 
detract from the brilliance and ingenuity of Yaari's paper. They show, 
rather, how-really difficult i.t is to achieve a c lean ·experimental design. 
Even aside from the above criticisms, 'it is difficult to assess 
Yaari's experimental technique and results due- to incomplete ·report�ng. 
Ideally, the report of experiments should include the instructions and the 
results in a form that permits other investigators to. reproduce, the 
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experiments and to use or evaluate the data. Yaari raises important 
issues with insight, and more rigorous tests of convexity would be 
valuable in increasing our understanding of behavior ·under uncertainty. 
The mo�ivation for the Yaari paper is, in part, to rationalize .the 
Friedman-Selvage "paradox," namely the co-existence of gambling and 
insurance for the same decision maker, but without the Friedrrtan­
Savage type of.nonconvex utility ' function. An alternative means of re­
conciliiig gambling and insurance within the eXpected utility hypothesis 
is to redefine utility tO include the commodity value of gambling. Cer­
tainly Yaari1s proposal redefines the criterion of choice among gambles 
broadly enough to include any such commodity value. However, Yaari's 
definition of subjective probability, which corresponds to probabilities 
under the expected Utility hypothesis, suggests an interpretation of_ 
behavior in terms of psychological distortions in 11true11 (or so-called 
"objective11) probabilities. Under this interpretation Yaari's subjects 
tend to "overstate" low probabilities and 11understate11 high probabilities. 
This interpretation is entirely consistent with the data, and one cannot, 
on these groUnds, arguC, with it as a behavioral hypothesis. 
But many economists, such as Samuelson [13; pp. 136, 144], 
Hirshleifer (8, pp. 257-264], and Smith [20], to name.only a few, have 
found it more natural .to explain the discrepancy between actual expec­
ted Utility-of'.'wealth behavi'Or ·and postulateid ewected utility-of-wealth
bEih<ivior, in terrris of what we ·can call the commodity value (or cost, if  
values.are negative) of gambling. 11Beating the machine, n winning on 
unlikely contingencies, or betting on a draw from an urn with unknown 
proportions of red and black balls (see Ellsberg [5]), may represent 
phenomena that yield special' utilities or dis utilities which are confounded 
with the subjective value of the monetary prizes -.von or lost. Thus, Dol­
bear_1s eXperimental procedure [ 4] carefull)r attempts to control on the 
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commodity valrie of gambling, by always confronting subjects with choices 
between gambles (as distinct froin. choices between gambles and cash.
prizes), while control over discrepancies between subjective and 11objec­
tive11 probabilities iS attempted by using gambles with probability 1/2 
associated with each payoff� 
Although many economists have made refere'nce to the importance 
of admitting of the commodity value of gambling it has not been systema­
tically studied theoretically or empirica�ly. Using a Friedman�Savage 
type diagram, the consistency of risk aversive behavior (concave utility 
of wealth) with gambling at mathematically unfavorable odds is easily 
illustrated. Let U(m) be the utility of wealth, monotone increasing and . 
concave. This function is assumed to. be given, quite uncontaminated by 
the c·ommodity value of gambling. This implies that if we ai-e to ever 
measuJTe U by choice behavior it must be accomplished in a nongambling 
context, or by using a psychologically neutral gambling machine or 
"canonical experiment" (see Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer [12]). Now let 
U*(m) be the ,utility of wealth m, when one also engages in a gamble de­
fined by specified unambiguous event contingencies. Think of utility as 
a function of two commodities, wealth, m, and ngambling.11 We can 
either. gamble (denoted by 1) or not gamble (denoted by 0). Thus, in 
terms of a two-commodity utility funCtion, ¢ ,  we have U{m) = ¢{m, 0),
U*(m) = ¢(m, 1). In general, we assume that gambling may interact 
with wealth in determining utility. 
Figures 1- 4 illustrate various conceivable examples of Uo::fm) 
functions. In Figure 1 gambling yieldS utility at all wealth levels. In 
Figure 2 gambling is discommodious if the person loses wealth (11insult11 
is added to injury), but c·omrnodious if he gains wealth. In Figure 3, the 
person1s utility or disutility of gambling is entirely symbolized by the 
amount won or lost so that a gambling game played without real money 
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Yields no subjective value. In Figure 1 and, possibly, Figure 2, the 
individual would pay to gamble just to see if he can 11win, 11 even though 
there are no monetary payoffs (e.g., playing poker just for valueless 
chips). In Figure 4, gambling is dis commodious for all wealth, -but not
unless real money is at stake. 
In Figure 3, we illustrate the effect of the utility of gambling on an 
individual's acceptance of an unfavorable bet. If gambling had no commodi­
ty value, then U{m} would be the appropriate utility function, and a mathe­
inatically unfavorable gamble with expected utility such as at Q would be 
rejected. But if U*(m) is the appropriate utility-with-gambling function, 
then this gamble would have expected utility given by R which exceeds the 
utility of not gambling at P 0• 
Now,. U*(m), viewed in terms of the commodity wealth, does indeed 
have a nonconvexity in a region near the origin, while interquadrant convex­
ity is borne out by the Yaari experimental results. However, in order to 
pick up gambling utilities or disutilities included in U*(m), considerably 
more experimental control may be necessary over the conditions of subject 
entry. In taking the origin ar'!:iitrarily as a point on the offer curve, Yaari 
not only assumes zero cost of entry for all gambles but, more important 
to the issue of the acceptance of mathematically unfair gambles, he as­
s,umes zero value for entry. Paying subjects for participating in the ex­
periment, as a means of reducing the 1'cost of entry, 11 may have the 'effect 
of destroying the commodity value of gambling (as in Figure 3) by permit­
ting it to occur with free or 11house11 money. Also if nonconvexities near 
the origin are to be identified, observations must be made in this region 
and it is not clear from Yaari1s report on the test of interquadrant con­
vexity that the experimental design allowed this. 
FIGURE 1. 
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3. Competitive Auction Markets 
The first experiments in competitive auction markets reported 
in [16] were conducted against the background of considerable skepti­
cism by Smith concerning the tentative hypothesis that supply and de­
mand theory might have some relevance to the observed performance 
of such simulated markets. This bears testimony to the power and in­
fluence of the revolt against competition, contained Largely in the con­
cepts associated with the theory of monopolistic competition. Econo­
metric studies were concerned ........ -ith measurement, or testing hypoth­
eses about coefficients, always under.the matinained hypothesis that 
price data were somehow generated·by supply and demand equilibria. 
Direct evidence was lacking, and, as Guy Orcutt once noted, the eco­
nometrician is in a position �ike that of an electri.'cal engineer who 
must infer the laws of electicity by listening to a radio play. 
References [16], [17], [lBJ and [7] constitute all the direct evi­
dence that seems to exist as to the empirical relevance of supply and de­
mand theory to competitive auctions. The research in these papers de­
monstrates the equilibrating power of the 0public auction" mechanism, 
and the possibilities of experimental methods in exploring the elementary 
foundations of economics. Economists need not be content with 11listen­
ing to a radio play. 11 
One of the important lessons of experimental economics is that the 
discipline of the laboratory is very demanding of economic theory. (We 
have already noted that experimental studies of utility cannot ignore 
"transaction11 costs.) Experimental competitive market design requires 
the specification of rules of exchange which circumscribe some process 
·whereby decision makers interact. The demand on economic theory is to 
provide models of the trading process which can be confronted with 
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experimental evidence. Traditional economic theory has not provided 
such a process. One macromarket adjustment hypothesis--the Wal­
rasian hypothesis--has dominated supply and demand theory. Yet this 
hypothesis is essentially a logical argument as to why nonequilibrium 
states cannot persist and cannot be considered as a serious model of a 
trading process. Thus, so it is argued, if "price11 is above equilibrium 
there is excess supply, and sellers will 11competitively" lower prices in 
an attempt to sell the excess. Yet competitive market theory requires 
each participant to take price as given. Such a theory omits explicit 
consideration of a multilateral negotiation:.-bid, offer, acceptance-­
process. There is no theoretical distinction between price quotations 
and actual transaction prices. Yet, all actual markets, including the 
over-the-counter securities markets as well as the organized commodity 
and stock exchanges, operate under formal or informal rules which govern 
the placing of bids and offers, and their acceptance to .form contracts. 
What is made plain by these experiments, and is the source of 
their greatest shortcoming, is the need for models of such a bid, offer, 
transaction process. In actual markets, as in the experimental markets, 
a bid is always a 2-tuple (pb, qb) specifying the maximum buying 
price 
and the maximum quantity legally acceptable to the buyer. That is, it 
is understood by the quotation that the bidder will accept at any lower 
price any quantity
. 
up to qb. This interpretation, besides being legal 
p:t;actice, is formalized in the trading rules of the New York Stock Ex­
change. Thus, a 11limit" bid (pb' qb) means that pb is the upper limit of 
the bid price commitment by the buyer. Also the rules of the Exchange 
prohibit 11all or none11 bids (and offers) so that if qb = 500, any part of the 
500 may be taken at a price no greater than pb. 
Similar considerations govern an offer, which is a 2-tuple (p0, q0) 
specifying the minimum buying price and the maximum quantity acceptable 
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to the seller at that price. 
2 The convex set of acceptable transactions 
represented by a bid (pb, qb) and by an off
er (p
0
, q0) are each illustrated 
in Figure 5 for individual supply (S) and demand (D) curves. Figure 6 
uses theEdgeworth box .offer curve{01 and02) representation to illus­
trate an offer (p�, q�1) of commodity# 1 by trader I, and an offer 
0 0 ( 1 /p1 1 , q211J of commo
.
dity # 2 by trader II. 
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Referring to Figure 6, if the term 11price11 in the Walrasian t$.ton­
nement process is interpreted as an offer, it is clear that it cannot be 
open-ended as to quantity. Thus if I, without knowledge of the offer 
curve o2, makes the unlimited price offer OP sho�n in Figure 6, he 
may be exposing himself to the risk of an acceptance that exceeds his 
resource capacity, as for example at P. 
On the other hand, the limit offer (p� , q�1) assures I that he cannot 
be made worse off by the acceptance of an element in the offer set, and 
precludes a contract beyond his offer curve, o1. Under the essential 
assumption of incomplete knowledge, there is no guarantee of contracts 
at the supply-demand equilibrium. However, the simple experim.ents in 
[16], [17] and [18] show strong convergence tendencies where the market 
is repeated under the same conditions of supply and demand. 
Using the above concept of an offer (or bid) many models of price 
adjustment processes might be developed. One type of model would be to 
postulate a subjective probability density, for a given trader, which as­
sociates a probability of acceptance with each possible offer. An offer 
by a trader could then be defined as one which maximized expected 
utility over this subjective density. Some appropriate assumption could 
then be introduced to modify (e.g., by Bayes1 theorem) this density in 
re�ponse to information, i.e., offers by other traders and whether they 
were accepted. An acceptance by a trader would occur, if a given out­
standing offer provided at least as good terms as that trader's expected 
utility-maximizing offer. Such a process provides a mechanism for 
generating both offers and transactions. 
Carlson1s [l] study of markets with a lagged supply response 
provides direct evidence on the relationship between past prices and 
expected future prices. The simple cobweb hypothesis, which has 
commanded so much attention in the literature, is not confirmed. 
Subjects are not so naive as to believe that next period1s price will be 
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the same as last period's price. T\�'o experimental supply and demand 
configurations, one divergent and one convergent, under the cobweb 
hypothesis, reveal stable and similar convergent behavior. Indeed, the 
results suggest that in a potentially divergent market, the greater are 
the initial price fluctuations, the less confidence a supplier will have in 
the last price as an indicator of the next price. In a subsequent paper 
Carlson [2] shows that if price expectations are based on an unweighted 
averag_e. of all past prices, if the excess demand function is decreasing, 
and if the supply and demand functions are linear, then an isolated mar­
ket always converges to the equilibrium price. 
Studies [l], [7], [16], [17] and [18] rePresent a small portion of the 
potential return from the application of experimental techniques to com­
petitive market behavior. The problem of dynamic mar_ket adjustments 
over time to changing demand or supply conditions could be studied with a 
design which permits subjects to buy for inventory in anticipation of more 
favorable future sales. 
General equilibrium models of exchange could be studied experi­
mentally. For example, in the two-commodity case the objects traded 
might be red and blue poker chips. Utility value would be induced on 
holdings of the two objects by means of a table associating a value 
V(qr' qb) in U.S. currency with each possible terminal holding (qr, qb) 
of red and blue chips.. The table provided to e_ach subject would then 
serve as his ordinal utility of red and blue chips provided only that the 
subject exhibit a monotone increasing utility function for U.S. currency, 
U(V). Thus U[V(q , q )] would induce a controlled subjective value on r b 
q
r
, qb 
independent of each subject1s actual utility for currency. That 
is, the marginal rate of substitution of red for blue poker chips, 
u' 1av /aqbl 
u'(aV/8qr) 
, will depend only on V(qr' qb) which is 
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predete::-mined by the table. Trading could be a matter of direct exchange 
of red cb.ips against blue, or through a monetary medium with red chips 
first tr;;.ded against nstage money,'1 then 11stage money11 against blue chips 
to com?lete a full rourid of exchange. The postulate that demand is homo­
geneous in nominal prices and ("stage11) money income could be tested, as 
well as the equivalence of monetary and direct exchange systems. 
Production and a producers' market could be added by introducing 
production function tables and trading in claims on labor input endowments 
(for example, white chips). But note that in such a general equilibrium 
model one would not have to introduce profit payoff tables for producer 
subjects. as in partial equilibrium oligop?lY experiments. The rewards 
of producers would be derived from their 11production11 of red and blue 
chips and sale to 11consumers. 11 The U[V(qr' qb)] functions of "consumer" 
subjects would be the entire driving force of the economy, inducing value, 
through production, upon artificial labor input endowments .. 
All experimental economics depends upon the maintained hypothesis 
that the utility of money, U(V), is monotone increasing. Different ex­
periments differ only in the decision arguments, assigned by the experi­
mental task, to the V function that one gives to the subject. 
l. 
2. 
Footnotes 
For a discussion and comparison of steady-state models of 
Bernoulli process predictions see R. Dwican Luce [9}. 
Special cases of the limit bid or offer are represented by so­
called "market11 orders which do not specify price. In these 
cases it is understood that pb 
= t<>, or p
0 
= 0, i.e., there is
no legal maximum price enforceable by a buyer, or legal 
minimum enforceable by a seller. 
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